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DE FACTO INCORPORATION AND ESTOPPEL TO DENY
CORPORATE EXISTENCE IN LOUISIANA
Using de facto incorporation and estoppel to deny corporate exist-
ence, courts have long bestowed corporate privileges despite failure sub-
stantially to comply with requisites for legal creation of a corporation.
While many jurisdictions were repudiating the two doctrines, Louisiana
attempted in 1968 to retain them. This comment will outline the remaining
utility of de facto incorporation and estoppel to deny corporate existence in
Louisiana.
The Traditional Common Law Rules
De Jure Incorporation
A de jure corporation is one created in substantial compliance with all
mandatory conditions precedent to incorporation. ' Its existence is usually
immune from even direct attack by the state.2 When the acts of formation
fall short of substantial compliance, the defective corporation 3 will seek
recognition under the de facto incorporation or estoppel to deny corporate
existence rules.
4
De Facto Incorporation
A de facto corporation is one created in colorable, good faith com-
pliance with an existing law, and for which there is a user of the corporate
franchise. Its existence may be attacked only in a direct proceeding by the
state, not collaterally by the state or by a private person. 5
1. Robertson v. Levy, 197 A.2d 443, 445 (D.C. Ct. App. 1964); H. BALLAN-
TINE, CORPORATIONS 71, 76 (rev. ed. 1946) [hereinafter cited as BALLANTINE]; H.
HENN, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF CORPORATIONs 238 (2d ed. 1970) [hereinafter
cited as HENN]; 8 W. FLETCHER, CYCLOPEDIA OF THE LAW OF PRIVATE CORPORA-
TIONS 38, 81 (rev. ed. 1966) [hereinafter cited as 8 FLETCHER]; see Frey, Legal
Analysis and the "De Facto" Doctrine, 100 U. PA. L. REV., 1153, 1155-56 (1952).
2. Robertson v. Levy, 197 A.2d 443, 445 (D.C. Ct. App. 1964); BALLANTINE,
supra note I, at 75-76; HENN, supra note 1, at 238 & n.3 (some jurisdictions permit
direct attack by the state if a condition subsequent to incorporation is not met); 8
FLETCHER, supra note 1, at 38; Frey, supra note 1, at 1155-56.
3. "Defective corporation," "organization," and "association" are used
broadly herein to designate the organization seeking recognition of its corporate
existence, whether or not the specific organization under consideration is due any
corporate privileges.
4. Certain corporate privileges can be acquired by other means, such as
contractual limitation of liability. Frey, supra note 1, at 1154.
5. Robertson v. Levy, 197 A.2d 443, 445 (D.C. Ct. App. 1964) (dictum);
BALLANTINE, supra note 1, at 76; HENN, supra note 1, at 240: 8 FLETCHER, supra
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Reflecting the early distrust of all corporations,6 courts at first re-
quired strict conformity with incorporation statutes before bestowing cor-
porate privileges.7 Later cases showed a tendency to bend the rules where
equity demanded, 8 to encourage stability in business transactions 9 and to
protect those acting in good faith from the harsh consequences of defective
incorporation; for in the usual case, the merits of a controversy are
unaffected by failure to conform strictly to statutory requirements and only
the rights of the state are impinged upon. 10 Authorities finally agreed on a
deceptively simple rationale of three requirements: 1 (1) an existing law
under which a de jure corporation of the same kind could have been
formed, (2) a colorable compliance with the statute while attempting in
good faith to incorporate,' 2 and (3) a user of the corporate franchise.
Despite the orderly rationale, application of the doctrine remained confus-
ing and met with disfavor among the commentators. 13
note 1, at 138-42; accord, Dillard v. Hal Brown & Co., 22 F.2d 677 (5th Cir.), cert.
denied, 277 U.S. 587 (1927) (Louisiana and general common law rules preclude
collateral attack); John Lucas & Co. v. Bernhardt's Estate, 156 La. 207, 100 So. 399
(1924); Weil v. Leopold Weil Bldg. & Imp. Co., 126 La. 938, 53 So. 56 (1910).
In cases where the de facto corporation attempts io exercise the power of
eminent domain, the majority rule precludes collateral attack, but there are many
cases to the contrary. BALLANTINE, supra note 1, at 86; HENN, supra note 1, at 242;
8 FLETCHER, supra note 1, at 170-74; cf. Tulare Irrig. Dist. v. Shepard, 185 U.S. 1
(1902) (dictum) (collateral attack is permitted). See also Shreveport Traction Co. v.
Kansas City, S. & G. Ry., 119 La. 759, 44 So. 457 (1907); New Orleans Terminal
Co. v. Teller, 113 La. 733, 37 So. 624 (1904).
6. Robertson v. Levy, 197 A.2d 443, 444 (D.C. Ct. App. 1964); H. BALLAN-
TINE, supra note 1, at 38; 1 W. FLETCHER, CYCLOPEDIA OF THE LAW OF PRIVATE
CORPORATIONS 6-7 (rev. ed. 1974) [hereinafter cited as 1 FLETCHER].
7. See Robertson v. Levy, 197 A.2d 443,444-45 (D.C. Ct. App. 1964). See also
1 FLETCHER, supra note 6, at 6-7.
8. See Robertson v. Levy, 197 A.2d 443, 444-45 (D.C. Ct. App. 1964). See
generally BALLANTINE, supra note 1, at 68-100; 8 FLETCHER, supra note 1, at 34-
187.
9. BALLANTINE, supra note 1, at 87; Note, 53 MICH. L. REV. 283, 184 n.5
(1954); accord, Screwmen's Benev. Ass'n v. Monteleone, 168 La. 664, 123 So. 116
(1929); New Iberia Sugar Co. v. Lagarde, 130 La. 387, 58 So. 16 (1912).
10. HENN, supra note 1, at 240; Note, 53 MICH. L. REV. 283, 284 (1954); see
BALLANTINE, supra note 1, at 87.
11. See, e.g., Tulare Irrig. Dist. v. Shepard, 185 U.S. 1, 13 (1902); Robertson v.
Levy, 197 A.2d 443, 445 (D.C. Ct. App. 1964); 8 FLETCHER supra note 1, at 48-50;
HENN, supra note 1, at 239-44; Frey, supra note I, at 1156.
12. Although the authorities differ as to the correct statement of the second
element, all either expressly or implicitly make good faith necessary for de facto
incorporation. Some, for example, make good faith a separate fourth element.
Robertson v. Levy, 197 A.2d 443, 445 (D.C. Ct. App. 1964); BALLANTINE, supra
note 1, at 77.
13. E.g., BALLANTINE, supra note 1, at 71 ("a discouraging and baffling
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The de facto corporation generally enjoys all the privileges of a de
jure corporation,' 4 except immunity from direct attack by the state.1 5
Thus, the de facto corporation and its members escape the consequences
of doing business without proper incorporation: personal liability of as-
sociates16 and denial of procedural 7 or contractual' 8 capacity.
Estoppel to Deny Corporate Existence
A "corporation by estoppel" is not really a corporation: it is merely
an association given one or more corporate attributes for equitable rea-
sons. 19 The courts invented estoppel to deny corporate existence when
confronted with cases where fairness demanded that an organization be
treated as a corporation despite an absence of the requisites for de jure or
maze"); Frey, supra note 1, at 1180 ("legal conceptualism at its worst"). Contrary
to what the traditional approach implies, there was really no one de facto doctrine,
owing to the many jurisdictional differences.
14. 8 FLETCHER, supra note 1, at 151-52; accord, Audobon Park Comm'n v.
Board of Comm'rs, 153 So. 2d 574, 577 (La. App. 4th Cir.), cert. denied, 156 So. 2d
223 (1963). But see BALLANTINE, supra note 1, at 71; HENN, supra note 1, at 242.
See generally Frey, supra note 1, at 1179 (criticizing the general rule because a
holding based on one type of defect might be extended improperly to another
factual context). Compare estoppel to deny corporate existence, where the party is
allowed only the specific corporate privilege at issue. BALLANTINE supra note 1, at
71, 88; 8 FLETCHER, supra note 1, at 290.
For examples of privileges which might be conferred on corporations, see LA.
CiV. CODE arts. 433-37 and Miller, The 1968 Business Corporation Law of Louisi-
ana, 29 LA. L. REV. 435, 449 (1969).
15. See authorities cited in note 2, supra.
16. Frey, supra note 1. Earlier cases found a partnership if there was no
cooperation and if estoppel did not apply, but there is now a reluctance to hold
inactive members liable as partners. HENN, supra note 1, at 249-50.
17. 8 FLETCHER, supra note 1, at 154. In Louisiana, an unincorporated associa-
tion now has the capacity to sue and be sued in its own name. LA. CODE CIV. P.
arts. 689 & 738.
18. 8 FLETCHER, supra note 1, at 161. Similarly, "[a] de facto corporation has
the same power to acquire and transfer property as a de jure corporation." Id. at
158; see HENN, supra note I, at 241-42. The Louisiana position is apparently in
accord. See LA. CIv. CODE art. 446 ("Corporations unauthorized by law... may
acquire and possess estates .. "); Supreme Council of the Lily of the Valley v.
Lee, 171 La. 433, 131 So. 289 (1930); Audobon Park Comm'n v. Board of Comm'rs,
153 So. 2d 574 (La. App. 4th Cir.), cert. denied, 156 So. 2d 223 (1963). But see Globe
Realty Co. v. Whitney, 106 La. 257, 30 So. 745 (1901); cf. Screwmen's Benev.
Ass'n v. Monteleone, 168 La. 664, 123 So. 116 (1929) (charter of corporation had
expired, therefore corporation could not pass marketable title to property it held).
19. E.g., Robertson v. Levy, 197 A.2d 443,445 (D.C. Ct. App. 1964) (" 'corpo-
ration by estoppel' ... is a complete misnomer."); 8 FLETCHER, supra note 1, at
191-92, 290; Comment, Estoppel to Deny Corporate Existence, 31 TENN. L. REV.
336 (1964).
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de facto incorporation. 20 The traditional elements for such estoppel were a
holding out of an association as a corporation, causing others to act in
reliance on their belief of valid incorporation. 2 1 However, courts some-
times apply estoppel to deny against a creditor of an organization merely
because he dealt with it as a corporation. 22 The "estoppel" label is
inappropriate in such situations, because the two traditional elements are
usually absent.
23
There are limitations on estoppel to deny corporate existence flowing
from the two traditional elements and from the nature of estoppel, an
equitable remedy used only when failure to apply it would cause injus-
tice.2' For example, estoppel will not lie when the conduct relied on was
consistent with recognizing a mere unincorporated association, 25 nor when
the party asserting estoppel had knowledge of the defective incor-
poration, 26 nor when a party was induced by fraud to recognize the
corporate existence.27 Furthermore, estoppel will not be applied against
the dictates of an express statutory prohibition28 or to matters beyond the
particular transaction or conduct working the estoppel .29
There is an overlap of areas covered by the de facto incorporation and
20. Robertson v. Levy, 197 A.2d 443, 445 (D.C. Ct. App. 1964).
21. 8 FLETCHER, supra note 1, at 194, 217; HENN, supra note 1, at 244; Estoppel
to Deny, supra note 19, at 338.
22. BALLANTINE, supra note 1, at 91-96; 8 FLETCHER, supra note 1, at 219;
HENN, supra note 1, at 244.
23. Robertson v. Levy, 197 A.2d 443, 445 (D.C. Ct. App. 1964); Estoppel to
Deny, supra note 19; at 341-42. See generally 8 FLETCHER, supra note 1, at 219-41.
See the text at note 163, infra.
24. 8 FLETCHER, supra note 1, at 235; Estoppel to Deny, supra note 19, at 346;
see BALLANTINE, supra note 1, at 88; HENN. supra note 1, at 244.
25. BALLANTINE, supra note 1, at 89; 8 FLETCHER. supra note 1, at 197-98;
accord, Williams v. Hewitt, 47 La. Ann. 1076, 17 So. 496 (1895); Spencer Field &
Co. v. Cooks, 16 La. Ann. 153 (1861).
26. 8 FLETCHER, supra note 1, at 214-15; accord, Provost v. Morgan's La. &
Tex. R. R., 42 La. Ann. 809, 8 So. 584 (1890); see Estoppel to Deny, supra note 19,
at 347.
27. 8 FLETCHER, supra note 1, at 218; Estoppel to Deny, supra note 19, at
347.
28. 8 FLETCHER, supra note 1, at 212; accord, Factors' & Traders' Ins. Co.
v. New Harbor Protection Co., 37 La. Ann. 233 (1885); Workingmen's Bank v.
Converse, 33 La. Ann. 963 (1881); Workingmen's Accommodation Bank v. Con-
verse, 29 La. Ann. 369 (1877). But see American Homestead Co. v. Linigan, 46 La.
Ann. 1118, 15 So. 369 (1894) (statutory prohibition against suit by a defective
corporation does not preclude estopping a defendant-shareholder when he is sued
by that organization).
29. 8 FLETCHER, supra note 1, at 237; Estoppel to Deny, supra note 19, at 346.
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estoppel to deny corporate existence theories 30 Often the elements neces-
sary for each occur in the same case.31 Although the authorities are in
conflict, the majority rule is probably that estoppel to deny can apply even
when the requisites of de facto incorporation are lacking.
32
Louisiana Law Before 1968
Providing a completely accurate formulation of the two doctrines as
they were applied in Louisiana prior to 1968 is impossible. The few
Louisiana cases have, over time, dealt with so many different statutory
provisions 33 that there are no clear majority positions on a given applica-
tion of de facto incorporation or estoppel to deny corporate existence.
Innumerable variations of fact prevent isolating the effect of a single
30. See Frey, supra note 1, at 1176 (concluding that whether dealings were on a
corporate basis is the deciding factor in many cases using the traditional de facto
incorporation rationale).
31. See, e.g., John Lucas & Co. v. Bernhardt's Estate, 156 La. 207, 100 So. 399
(1924); Bond & Braswell v. Scott Lumber Co., 128 La. 818, 55 So. 468 (1911).
32. See Robertson v. Levy, 197 A.2d 443, 445 (D.C. Ct. App. 1964) (dictum);
BALLANTINE, supra note 1, at 88; 8 FLETCHER, supra note 1, at 201-05; HENN,
supra note I, at 244; Estoppel to Deny, supra note 19, at 337-38.
Louisiana embraces the majority rule. Tulane Imp. Co. v. S. A. Chapman &
Co., 129 La. 562, 56 So. 509 (1911); Bond & Braswell v. Scott Lumber Co., 128 La.
818, 55 So. 468 (1911); see North Am. Contr. Corp. v. Gibson, 327 So. 2d 444 (La.
App. 3d Cir.), cert. denied, 332 So. 2d 280 (La. 1976). But cf. Weil v. Leopold Weil
Bldg. & Imp. Co., 126 La. 938, 53 So. 56 (1910) (dictum) (estoppel cannot apply
where a corporation "has no legal existence").
33. E.g., LA. R.S. 12:25 & 26 (Supp. 1968) (See notes 125 & 139, infra); LA.
R.S. 12:5, 9 & 10 (1950) (identical to its immediate predecessor); La. Acts 1928, No.
250, §§ 5, 9 & 10 (providing (1) that corporate existence shall begin upon local
recordation, (2) for recording with the Secretary of State and issuance of a certifi-
cate of incorporation by him, (3) that the certificate shall be conclusive evidence of
due incorporation against all but the state, and (4) for personal liability of officers
and directors conducting business prior to local recording or paying-in of capital);
La. Acts 1914, No. 267, § 2 (requiring publication of the charter and making the
certificate of incorporation issued by ,the Secretary of State prima facie proof of
legal corporate existence); La. Acts 1904, No. 120, §§ 1 & 2 (similar to Act 78 of
1904, § 2, but applicable to all corporations); La. Acts 1904, No. 78, § 2
("[W]herever parties have attempted to form a corporation and have executed,
recorded and published the charter, all contracts made and acts done by such
corporation shall be treated as the contracts and acts of valid corporations" except
as against the state. Section 3 made the act inapplicable to insurance or banking
corporations or those with the power of eminent domain.); La. Acts 1898, No. 59
(required recording with the Secretary of State); La. Acts 1888, No. 36 (required
use of the word "limited" in the corporate name and provided that a "mere
informality" would not render the charter null or make a shareholder personally
liable); La. Acts 1852, No. 176, § 4 (required local recording of the charter and
subscriptions, and publication of the charter).
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defect in formation. Authorities have complained of the same difficulty
when dealing with the many common law cases. 3 The Louisiana courts
were usually content to cite the common law authorities' general rules,
which were themselves misleading,35 without explaining the exact analy-
sis used to reach the decision. 36 This confusion, not unique to Louisiana,
was one incentive for adopting the more certain provisions of the Model
Business Corporation Act. 37 Despite the impracticability of formulating
unassailable "Louisiana rules," the decisions will be summarized so far
as possible to facilitate later discussion of the remaining utility of the de
facto incorporation and estoppel to deny corporate existence theories. The
general common law rule in each case will be compared. 3
De Facto Incorporation
Louisiana has adopted the general common law rules of de facto
incorporation by court decision and by statute. For example, in Weil v.
Leopold Weil Building & Improvement Co., 39 the Louisiana Supreme
Court held that even though the purposes of the corporation under attack
were not authorized by statute, there was de facto incorporation, reasoning
that: "[1]t could not be said, that the attempt might not be made in good
faith, and if, the conditions of that section having been complied with,
there should be a subsequent user of the corporate franchise, nothing more
would be needed for the creation of a corporation de facto. "40
34. Frey, supra note 1, at 1175; see BALLANTINE, supra note 1, at 71.
35. Frey, supra note 1, at 1178-79; see BALLANTINE, supra note 1, at 71; 8
FLETCHER, supra note 1, at 47-48.
36. See, e.g., Supreme Council of the Lily of the Valley v. Lee, 171 La. 433,
131 So. 289 (1930); Shreveport Traction Co. v. Kansas City, S. & G. Ry., 119 La.
759, 44 So. 457 (1907).
37. See ABA-ALI MODEL Bus. CORP. ACT §§ 56 & 146, Comments (1971)
[hereinafter cited as MODEL ACT].
38. It is important to note the general rules stated by 8 FLETCHER, supra note 1,
because the revision committee's comment to section 26 of The Louisiana Business
Corporation Law of 1%8 expressly refers to that work (an earlier edition) after
calling for "full application" of the de facto incorporation and estoppel to deny
corporate existence theories.
39. 126 La. 938, 53 So. 56 (1910).
40. Id. at 956, 53 So. at 62; accord, Screwmen's Benev. Ass'n v. Monteleone,
168 La. 664, 123 So. 116 (1929); Audobon Park Comm'n v. Bd. of Comm'rs, 153 So.
2d 574 (La. App. 4th Cir.), cert. denied, 156 So. 2d 223 (1963).
Some early cases required substantial compliance before bestowing any corpo-
rate status. Williams v. Hewitt, 47 La. Ann. 1076, 17 So. 496 (1895); Spencer Field
& Co. v. Cooks, 16 La. Ann. 153 (1861); Finlay, Dicks & Co. v. Caire, 6 Orl. App.
303 (La. App. 1909); Ahrens & Ott Mfg. Co. v. Caire, 5 Orl. App. 154 (La. App.
1908).
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Louisiana Act 78 of 1904, section 2, 4 1 adopted the traditional de facto
doctrine.4 2 The statute provided that when persons attempt to form a
corporation and execute, record, and publish a charter, a corporation so
formed is to be treated as a valid corporation.
43
To help predict the result likely in a certain instance, decisions on de
facto incorporation are classified here by the type of irregularity occurring
in each case rather than simply by the traditional rationale. Two qualifica-
tions are necessary: a rule as to one defect might not control where other
irregularities are present in the same case, and all decisions are affected by
the interplay of the estoppel rationale."
When the articles of incorporation were not recorded at the time of
the transaction, both the Louisiana45 and the general common law' rules
deny de facto status. Between 1928 and 1968, the Louisiana courts were
constrained to apply this majority rule, as the Louisiana Business Corpora-
tion Act of 1928, section 9,47 imposed joint and several liability on officers
and directors participating in business transactions before the articles of
incorporation were filed for record in the office of the Recorder of
Mortgages." In the 1968 revision of the Business Corporation Law, the
41. See note 33, supra.
42. Bond & Braswell v. Scott Lumber Co., 128 La. 818, 55 So. 468 (1911);
Leader Realty Co. v. Lakeview Land Co., 127 La. 1059, 54 So. 350 (1911); see
Ozone Lumber Co. v. King, 7 Orl. App. 501 (La. App. 1910).
43. La. Acts 1904, No. 120, § 2, note 33, supra, applied to types of corporations
not covered by Act 78, but was otherwise similar. See Provident Bank & Trust Co.
v. Saxon, 123 La. 243, 48 So. 922 (1909); Shreveport Traction Co. v. Kansas City,
S. & G. Ry., 119 La. 759, 44 So..457 (1907); Louisiana Nat'l Bank v. Henderson,
116 La. 413, 40 So. 779 (1906); Provident Bank & Trust Co. v. Saxon, 116 Sa. 408,
40 So. 778 (1906).
44. See BALLANTINE, supra note 1, at 68-71, 80-81; Frey, supra note 1, passim.
45. Provident Bank & Trust Co. v. Saxon, 116 La. 408, 40 So. 778 (1906);
Spencer Field & Co. v. Cooks, 16 La. Ann. 153 (1861) (cases cited note 48, infra);
see Lind v. Senton, 10 La. App. 633 (1929); Workingmen's Accommodation Bank
v. Converse, 29 La. Ann. 369 (1877). But cf. John Lucas & Co. v. Bernhardt's
Estate, 156 La. 207, 100 So. 399 (1924) (alternative holding) (estoppel and de facto
incorporation both used. Court did not say there was no recording: it noted only a
failure to record with the Secretary of State, without disclosing whether local
recording had taken place).
46. 8 FLETCHER, supra note 1, at 105-07; Bennett, The Louisiana Business
Corporation Act of 1928, 2 LA. L. REV. 597, 605 (1940); see Frey, supra note 1, at
1158-62, 1176-77. See also HENN, supra note 1, at 242-44. There are conflicting
decisions on this issue, as with most de facto incorporation questions. BALLANTINE,
supra note 1, at 78; 8 FLETCHER, supra note 1, at 103, 105-07.
47. La. Acts 1928, No. 250, § 9 incorporated as LA. R.S. 12:9 (1950). Relevant
provisions are outlined at note 33, supra.
48. See Daniel A. Pouwels & Assoc. v. Fiumara, 233 So. 2d 16 (La. App. 4th
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provision was "eliminated to permit the full application of the defacto-
corporation and estoppel-to-deny-corporate-existence rules." 49
When the statutes require recording of the articles both locally and at
the Secretary of State's office, and the articles were recorded locally only,
the general rule is that a de facto corporation exists." The Louisiana case
of Bond & Braswell v. Scott Lumber Co. 5 1 conferred de facto status in
this situation, reasoning that while filing locally was a condition precedent
to incorporation, filing with the Secretary of State was not. No Louisiana
case has ruled on the converse situation, where filing is required locally
and with the Secretary of State but the articles are recorded only with the
Secretary of State. Aside from Bond & Braswell, which is dictum in this
context, there is nothing to indicate that the courts here would deviate
from the general rule,5 2 which is to confer de facto status.
Noncompliance with paid-in capital requirements usually does not
preclude de facto incorporation.5 3 The earlier Louisiana cases agreed.5 4
Many jurisdictions make paid-in capital a mere condition precedent to
doing business ;55 Louisiana adopted this course in 1928,56 thus making the
Cir. 1970); Southland Rentals, Inc. v. Walker, 147 So. 2d 73 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1962),
cert. denied, 243 La. 1007, 149 So. 2d 764 (1963); Avoyelles Wholesale Grocery Co.
v. Ville Platte Sawmill Co., 17 La. App. 56, 135 So. 251 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1931);
Bennett, supra note 46, at 605-06.
49. LA. R.S. 12:26 (Supp. 1968), Comment. For a discussion of the deletion and
the comment, see the text at note 126, infra.
50. 8 FLETCHER, supra note 1, at 107-08; see BALLANTINE, supra note 1, at 78.
But see Frey, supra note 1, at 1165-67 (organization in this circumstance is treated
as if there were no recording anywhere; author considers only those cases where
personal liability of associates was sought).
51. 128 La. 818, 55 So. 468 (1911); cf. John Lucas & Co. v. Berhnardt's Estate,
156 La. 207, 100 So. 399 (1924) (alternative holding-estoppel and de facto incorpo-
ration both used. The court noted only a failure to record with the Secretary of
State, without disclosing whether local recording had taken place). See generally
HENN, supra note 1, at 238-39 (explaining conditions precedent to incorporation).
52. 8 FLETCHER, supra note 1, at 107-08; see BALLANTINE, supra note 1, at 78;
Frey, supra note 1, at 1167-69, 1177. See also HENN. supra note 1, at 242 (Many
jurisdictions provide by statute that filing with the Secretary of State begins corpo-
rate existence; local filing is merely a condition subsequent to incorporation).
53. 8 FLETCHER, supra note 1, at 96; see BALLANTINE, supra note 1, at 83-84;
Frey, supra note 1, at 1170.
54. See Dillard v. Hal Brown & Co., 22 F. 2d 677 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 277
U.S. 587 (1927); Chronos Land Co. v. Crichton, 150 La. 963, 91 So. 408 (1922);
Bond & Braswell v. Scott Lumber Co., 128 La. 818, 55 So. 468 (1911); Leader
Realty Co. v. Lakeview Land Co., 127 La. 1059, 54 So. 350 (1911).
55. BALLANTINE, supra note 1, at 83-84; 8 FLETCHER, supra note 1, at 98-102;
Frey, supra note 1, at 1170.
56. La. Acts 1928, No. 250, § 9 incorporated as LA. R.S. 12:9 (1950).
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de facto doctrine inapplicable in this situation.17 Of course, denominating
this requirement a condition precedent to doing business does not deter-
mine the availability of the important corporate attribute of limited liability
for associates.5 8 The courts have no freedom to protect the associates when
the express requirements of a statute are disobeyed and liability is express-
ly imposed therefor. One commentator has argued convincingly that, in
the absence of such a provision, paying in at least a part of the required
amount weighs heavily in favor of bestowing the privilege of limited
liability.5 9
There is a distinction in Louisiana between the effect of disobeying
paid-in capital rules and disobeying stock subscription rules. Louisiana
courts have denied de facto status to organizations failing either to procure
or to record stock subscriptions.' This position appears contrary to the
general rule that subscription to capital stock is unnecessary for de facto
existence. 61 However, in the case of such defects, statutes often expressly
answer the question of corporate capacity. 62 Thus the Louisiana decisions,
57. See Three Bros. Towing Co. v. Louisiana Gulf Indus., Inc., 317 F. Supp.
814 (E.D. La. 1969); Sulphur Export Corp. v. Carribean Clipper Lines, Inc., 277 F.
Supp. 632 (E.D. La. 1968); Temple Iron Works, Inc. v. Reburn Oil & Gas, Inc., 187
So. 2d 160 (La. App. 2d Cir.), cert. denied, 249 La. 472, 187 So. 2d 446 (1966);
Construction Eng'r Co. v. Village Shopping Center, Inc., 168 So. 2d 826 (La. App.
2d Cir. 1964), cert. denied, 247 La. 261, 170 So. 2d 512 (1%5); Wunsch v. Noel, 177
So. 92 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1937).
58. See Frey, supra note 1, at 1169-73.
59. Id. at 1169-73, 1177.
60. See Globe Realty Co. v. Whitney, 106 La. 257, 30 So. 745 (1901) (at time of
transaction, corporation did not have the statutorily required amount of capital
stock subscribed); Williams v. Hewitt, 47 La. Ann. 1076, 17 So. 496 (1895) (corpora-
tion had failed to list the number of shares held by each shareholder as required by
law); Ahrens & Ott Mfg. Co. v. Caire, 5 Orl. App. 154 (La. App. Orl. Cir. 1908)
(failure to record list of subscriptions). See also Louisiana Nat'l Bank v. Hender-
son, 116 La. 413, 40 So. 779 (1906) (failure to record original stock subscriptions;
remanded to determine whether defects were cured by La. Acts 1904, No. 120, the
statute adopting the de facto doctrine); Sentell v. Hewitt, 50 La. Ann. 3, 22 So. 970
(1898) (failure to record list of subscribers; limited liability permitted on estoppel
and contractual grounds).
Measuring the effect of these cases is complicated by some early decisions
requiring substantial compliance under La. Acts 1888, No. 36. Compare Williams v.
Hewitt, 47 La. Ann. 1076, 17 So. 496 (1895) and Ahrens & Ott Mfg. Co. v. Caire, 5
Orl. App. 154 (La. App. 1905) (both finding no substantial compliance when other
defects besides subscription irregularities were present) with Finlay Dicks & Co. v.
Caire, 6 Orl. App. 303 (La. App. 1909) (holding that when the sole defect was failure
to record the list of stock subscriptions, there was substantial compliance).
61. 8 FLETCHER supra note 1, at 96-103; see BALLANTINE, supra note 1, at 83
(both caution that there is conflict in the decisions).
62. See authorities cited in note 61, supra.
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which denied de facto status because of controlling statutes,63 did not
depart from the traditional rationale in order to reach their contrary result.
The -early Louisiana rule denied de facto status in cases where a
corporation was formed for a purpose prohibited6' or unauthorized 65 by
law, or where a corporation was formed for two purposes incompatible
under the statutes.' There are, however, contrary later decisions. 67 Logic
supports the early rule, for Louisiana has expressly adopted the first
element of the traditional de facto doctrine, existence of a statute under
which a de jure corporation of the same kind could have been formed. 6
The majority position in the general common law agrees with Louisiana's
early cases, but there are contrary decisions.
69
On the question of incorporation under an unconstitutional statute the
sole Louisiana authority is a dictum hinting that a municipal corporation so
formed should be recognized as de facto. 70 One commentator has stated:
"The better rule is that there cannot be a corporation de facto created
under a statute which is unconstitutional, since an unconstitutional law is
absolutely void, and a void law is no law." ' 71 While titling this the
majority rule, he added that contrary decisions abound. 72
63. See cases cited in note 60, supra.
64. See Lehman & Co. v. Knapp, 48 La. Ann. 1148, 20 So. 674 (1896);
Workingmen's Accommodation Bank v. Converse, 29 La. Ann. 369 (1877).
65. See Vredenburg v. Behan, 33 La. Ann. 627 (1881).
66. See Bayou Cook Nav. & Fish. Co. v. Doullut, 111 La. 517, 35 So. 729
(1904).
67. See Weil v. Leopold Weil Bldg. & Imp. Co., 126 La. 938, 53 So. 56 (1910);
Dilzell Eng'r & Constr. Co. v. Lehmann, 120 La. 273, 45 So. 138 (1907) (dictum)
(even if incorporators intended to form under a statute not authorizing such a
corporation, due incorporation may be found under another statute - La. Acts
1904, No. 78, a statute adopting the de facto doctrine); Shreveport Traction.Co. v.
Kansas City, S. & G. Ry., 119 La. 759, 44 So. 457 (1907) (dictum) (even if combining
street and other railroads in the same charter were illegal, the corporation was valid
under La. Acts 1904, No. 120, a statute adopting the de facto doctrine). See also
New Orleans Debenture Redemption Co. v. Louisiana, 180 U.S. 320 (1901), aff'g 51
La. Ann. 1827, 26 So. 586 (1899) (corporation had acquired de facto existence even
though organized for unauthorized purpose; therefore, allowing suit against the
organization without joining the shareholders did not violate due process; but the
Louisiana court had not dealt with the issue of de facto status).
68. See cases cited in notes 40 & 42, supra. See also 8 FLETCHER, supra note 1,
at 56-59.
69. Id. at 56-60.
70. Chicago, St. L. & N.O.R. v. Town of Kentwood, 49 La. Ann. 931, 22 So.
192 (1897).
71. 8 FLETCHER, supra note 1, at 62-63 (footnote omitted); accord, BALLAN-
TINE. supra note 1, at 80-81.
72. 8 FLETCHER, supra note 1, at 64-66; accord, BALLANTINE, supra note 1, at
80-81.
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In Louisiana prior to 1968, "when a charter of a corporation
expire[d] by limitation of time as fixed in the charter, the corporation
[was] thereby dissolved and cease[d] to exist, and [was] without any
corporate powers either de jure or de facto."73 The general common law
position is identical: 74 it is the source of the quoted rule.
75
That incorporators lack capacity to incorporate does not preclude de
facto status. 76 Again, Louisiana agreed with the general rule.77
The early Louisiana cases showed uncharacteristic deviation from the
general rule when the articles of incorporation were not published proper-
ly. 78 Later Louisiana decisions79 appear to have agreed with the general
rule, which bestows de facto status in this situation; s0 however, because
these cases involve several defects each, the impact of failure to publish
cannot be isolated with precision.
Estoppel to Deny Corporate Existence
The Louisiana courts did not track the general common law estoppel
rationale as closely as they did the common law de facto doctrine. They
attempted, not always successfully, to restate the elements of estoppel and
to repudiate the use of estoppel against a creditor of the defective corpora-
tion.
Many Louisiana decisions focused on whether a "benefit" was
received by the estopped party."1 This approach, though somewhat broad-
73. Screwmen's Benev. Ass'n v. Monteleone, 168 La. 664, 672, 123 So. 116,
119 (1929).
74. 8 FLETCHER, supra note 1, at 133-34. However, there are many contrary
decisions. Id. at 134-36; BALLANTINE, supra note 1, at 98 ("By the better view
corporate existence continues either de facto or by estoppel, for some purposes,
even after the expiration of the charter. ); Note, 33 MICH. L. REV. 633
(1935).
75. Screwmen's Benev. Ass'n v. Monteleone, 168 La. 664, 123 So. 116 (1929).
76. 8 FLETCHER. supra note 1, at 85-87.
77. See Bond & Braswell v. Scott Lumber Co., 128 La. 818, 55 So. 468 (1911);
Audobon Park Comm'n v. Board of Comm'rs, 153 So. 2d 574 (La. App. 4th Cir.),
cert. denied, 156 So. 2d 223 (1963).
78. Williams v. Hewitt, 47 La. Ann. 1076, 17 So. 496 (1895); Ahrens & Ott Mfg.
Co. v. Caire, 5 Orl. App. 154 (La. App. 1908). See also Monroe Sand & Gravel Co.
v. Sanders, 79 F.2d 292 (5th Cir. 1935); Louisiana Nat'l Bank v. Henderson, 116 La.
413, 40 So. 779 (1906).
79. See Chronos Land Co. v. Crichton, 150 La. 963, 91 So. 408 (1922); Provi-
dent Bank & Trust Co. v. Saxon, 123 La. 243, 48 So. 922 (1909).
80. 8 FLETCHER, supra note 1, at 114-15.
81. See Anderson v. Thompson, 51 La. Ann. 727, 25 So. 399 (1899); Lehman &
Co. v. Knapp, 48 La. Ann. 1148, 20 So. 674 (1896); Williams v. Hewitt, 47 La. Ann.
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er in statement, operates much like the common law requirement of
"reliance," especially when one considers that both common law requi-
sites ("holding out" and "reliance") are often disregarded.82 If the party
to be estopped has received a benefit he would not otherwise have
obtained without the pretended incorporation, the party invoking estoppel
must have relied on the ostensible corporate existence. In those cases
where the benefit to the estopped party does not flow from an advantage
gained by assuming incorporation, such as estopping a creditor of an
organization merely because he dealt with it as a corporation,83 the
elements of "holding out" and "reliance" are also lacking.
Williams v. Hewitt84 is a well-reasoned case refusing to apply estop-
pel. Unlike many other Louisiana decisions, it emphasized the importance
of finding the common law elements of "holding out" and "reliance," as
well as the analogous Louisiana requirement of "benefit." The plaintiff
depositors were permitted to attack the corporate existence of a bank in
order to impose personal liability on the shareholders. The Louisiana
Supreme Court reasoned:
The plaintiffs have obtained no benefit or advantage from defendants,
nor done any act or pursued any line of conduct by which defendants
have been prejudiced, or at all inconsistent with plaintiffs' suit to
obtain their money from those who took it on deposit.85
The Louisiana courts at first tried to eliminate the misapplication of
estoppel occurring when a creditor is precluded from denying the corpo-
1076, 17 So. 496 (1895); American Homestead Co. v. Linigan, 46 La. Ann. 1118, 15
So. 369 (1894); Oliver v. Home Serv. Ice Co., 161 So. 766 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1935);
National Oil Works, Inc. v. Korn Bros., 6 La. App. 75 (La. App. Orl. Cir.), rev 'd on
other grounds, 164 La. 800, 114 So. 659(1927). An example of a party who should
be estopped because he has received a benefit is a debtor of a corporation on a
contract made iin the corporate name who, when called to pay, asserts that the
creditor organization was not duly incorporated and therefore did not have capacity
to contract. See Lehman & Co. v. Knapp. The latest estoppel case retains the
"benefit" rationale. North Am. Contr. Corp. v. Gibson, 327 So. 2d 444 (La. App.
3d Cir.), cert. denied, 332 So. 2d 280 (La. 1976).
Louisiana courts also employed the common law elements of estoppel: "hold-
ing out" and "reliance". See, e.g., Williams v. Hewitt, 47 La. Ann. 1076, 17 So. 496
(1895); East Pascagoula Hotel Co. v. West, 13 La. Ann. 545 (1858); Southland
Rentals Inc. v. Walker, 147 So. 2d 73 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1962), cert. denied, 243 La.
1007, 149 So. 2d 764 (1963).
82. BALLANTINE. supra note 1, at 88; Estoppel to Deny, supra note 19, at 341-
47; see the text at notes 164 & 165, infra.
83. Estoppel To Deny, supra note 19, at 341-47.
84. 47 La. Ann. 1076, 17 So. 496 (1895).
85. Id. at 1084, 17 So. at 498.
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rate existence merely because he had contracted with the organization on a
corporate basis.6 This is a misuse of estoppel because it lacks the essential
elements. "Benefit," 8" "holding out," and "reliance ' 8 are absent: the
creditor would get no more than he had a right to expect from a corpora-
tion-performance as agreed-and the creditor has not asserted the corpo-
ration's existence or caused the organization and its members to rely on
the immunity from personal liability. Fault rests only with the incor-
porators.
That situation must be distinguished from estopping a debtor of a
corporation. The early case of Lehman & Co. v. Knapp 9 reasoned:
The plea of estoppel has never been applied to the creditor of a
corporation seeking the payment of his claim. . . . [T]he debtor has
received a benefit that estops him; . . . the creditor has sued to
recover an amount due by those who have failed to avail themselves
of the terms of the statute.90
Estopping a debtor is especially appropriate when he is a shareholder
whose payments for subscribed stock are owing.
91
Notwithstanding the cogent arguments and authorities against it, the
inappropriate form of estoppel survived. Later cases used it on the ground
that to allow a creditor to deny the corporate existence of his debtor would
impose an obligation not contemplated by the contracting parties.
92
86. See Louisiana Nat'l Bank v. Henderson, 116 La. 413, 40 So. 779 (1906);
Provident Bank & Trust Co. v. Saxon, 116 La. 408, 40 So. 778 (1906); Lehman &
Co. v. Knapp, 48 La. Ann. 1148, 20 So. 674 (1896); Williams v. Hewitt, 47 La. Ann.
1076, 17 So. 496 (1895).
87. Lehman & Co. v. Knapp, 48 La. Ann. 1148, 20 So. 674 (1896); Williams v.
Hewitt, 47 La. Ann. 1076, 17 So. 496 (1895).
88. Estoppel to Deny, supra note 19, at 441-42; see Timberline Equip. Co. v.
Davenport, 267 Or. 64, 514 P.2d 1109 (1973) (dictum); cf. Robertson v. Levy, 197
A.2d 443, 445 (D.C. Ct. App. 1964) (dictum) (referring to all applications of estop-
pel: "there was not estoppel in the pure sense of the word because generally there
was no holding out followed by reliance on the part of the other party."). See
generally BALLANTINE, supra note 1, at 91-96.
89. 48 La. Ann. 1148, 20 So. 674 (1896).
90. Id. at 1154, 20 So. at 677. For further discussion of this application of
estoppel, see the text at note 107, infra.
91. See Williams v. Hewitt, 47 La. Ann. 1076, 17 So. 496 (1895) (dictum);
Latiolais v. Citizens' Bank, 33 La. Ann. 1444 (1881); East Pascagoula Hotel Co. v.
West, 13 La. Ann. 545 (1858); cf. 8 FLETCHER, supra note 1, at 256 (stating the
general rule that shareholders are estopped to deny corporate existence); Estoppel
to Deny, supra note 19, at 343-44 (noting cases where estoppel is applied against
stockholders in a suit on the stock subscription). See further discussion in the text
at notes 97-100, infra.
92. Tulane Imp. Co. v. S.A. Chapman & Co., 129 La. 562, 56 So. 509 (1911);
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The following classification of the estoppel decisions by party es-
topped helps to clarify the law, but the rules derived must be used
cautiously. Assuming unvarying rules will mislead and confuse, for estop-
pel to deny corporate existence is an equitable doctrine demanding case-
by-case treatment. 93
An organization and its members are usually estopped to deny the
corporation's existence when it is sued as a debtor on a contract made as a
corporation, 94 although merely using a name signifying corporate status
might not work an estoppel. 95 In the only case before 1968 in Louisiana, a
corporation attempted to escape a contractual price limitation on ice sold
to its incorporators, retail ice dealers, by alleging that it had signed the
contract before attaining legal status. The court held the corporation
estopped from denying its own existence.%
Similarly, in Louisiana a shareholder is estopped when he would
attack the corporate existence in defense of a suit by the corporation on his
stock subscription97 or contract with the corporation.98 Nor can a share-
holder, when he wants the corporation dissolved in order to take his share
of the corporate assets, deny its existence after long participation in the
Bond & Braswell v. Scott Lumber Co., 128 La. 818, 55 So. 468 (1911); see Reynolds
v. St. John's Grand Lodge, 171 La. 295, 131 So. 186 (1930) (dictum) ("The broad
rule deducible from all the pertinent cases is that one dealing with a corporation is
estopped to deny its corporate existence."); John Lucas & Co. v. Bernhardt's
Estate, 156 La. 207, 100 So. 399 (1924); cf. Evans v. Delta By-Products, 52 So.2d
593 (La. App. Orl. Cir. 1951) (plaintiff creditor was not permitted to recover from
officer of defective corporation; holding unclear); Calhoun v. David Burk Co., 153
So. 568 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1934) (creditor estopped, but basis of holding unclear).
See also Sentell v. Hewitt, 50 La. Ann. 3, 22 So. 970 (1898).
93. See BALLANTINE, supra note 1, at 88; 8 FLETCHER, supra note 1, at 192,
235; Estoppel to Deny, supra note 19, at 346-47.
94. BALLANTINE, supra note 1, at 90; 8 FLETCHER, supra note 1, at 241-42, 248-
49; Estoppel to Deny, supra note 19, at 338-41.
95. 8 FLETCHER, supra note 1, at 245-47.
96. Oliver v. Home Serv. Ice Co., 161 So. 766 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1935); accord,
North Am. Contr. Corp. v. Gibson, 327 So. 2d 444 (La. App. 3d Cir.), cert. denied,
332 So.2d 280 (La. 1976).
97. Williams v. Hewitt, 47 La. Ann. 1076, 17 So. 496 (1895) (dictum); Latiolais
v. Citizens' Bank, 33 La. Ann. 1444 (1881); East Pascagoula Hotel Co. v. West, 13
La. Ann. 545 (1858); see Dilzell Eng'r & Constr. Co. v. Lehmann, 120 La. 273, 45
So. 138 (1907) (shareholder estopped when sued for the value of his stock subscrip-
tion by a creditor of the corporation); Peychaud v. Lane, 24 La. Ann. 404 (1872)
(alternative holding).
98. American Homestead Co. v. Linigan, 46 La. Ann. 1118, 15 So. 369 (1894);
Latiolais v. Citizens' Bank, 33 La. Ann. 1444 (1881).
1134 [Vol. 37
COMMENTS
organization's activities. 99 The common law general rule mirrors the
Louisiana position in these situations. 100
Under the usual rule, an organization may not deny corporate exist-
ence in an action once it has admitted corporate existence in pleading or if
it has appeared as a corporation contesting the merits.'10 Louisiana au-
thorities on this issue agree: "[Clorporate capacity assumed to obtain a
standing in court cannot be afterward denied .. "102
Third parties dealing with the corporation have been estopped to
deny the corporate existence where "holding out" and "reliance" are
present. Furthermore, as discussed above, creditors are often estopped
even if there is no "holding out," "benefit" to the estopped party, or
"reliance" by the defendants, e.g., when the contract was made in the
usual course of business, the creditor believing the organization validly
incorporated. 03 The Louisiana rule in this instance now appears to com-
port with the common law position that a creditor can be estopped merely
because he contracted with an organization as if it were a corporation. 104
However, since the earlier cases holding that such estoppel is inappropri-
ate have not been expressly rejected, there remains the possibility that the
courts will strictly interpret estoppel rationale in a given case, to require at
least a benefit to the estopped party caused by his affirmative act mislead-
ing the corporation and its members.
A creditor who contracted, knowing he dealt with an inchoate corpo-
99. Anderson v. Thompson, 51 La. Ann. 727, 25 So. 399 (1899); see Weil v.
Leopold Weil Bldg. & Imp. Co., 126 La. 938, 53 So. 56 (1910). But see Factors' &
Traders' Ins. Co. v. New Harbor Protection Co., 37 La. Ann. 233 (1885) (an
incorporator seeking to dissolve the defective organization was not estopped be-
cause there can be no estoppel where it is legally impossible to incorporate;
corporations had attempted to join and form a corporation, but only natural persons
were permitted to do so). See also Reynolds v. St. John's Grand Lodge, 171 La.
395, 131 So. 186 (1930) (members fully aware of, and some voting for, a sale of
corporate property were estopped from denying the corporation's existence in their
action to annul the sale).
100. 8 FLETCHER, supra note 1, at 250, 256-60; Estoppel to Deny, supra note 19,
at 343-44.
101. 8 FLETCHER, supra note 1, at 270, 273.
102. Williams v. Hewitt, 47 La. Ann. 1076, 1084, 17 So. 496, 498 (1895) (dictum);
accord, Jones v. Trustees of the Congregation of Mount Zion, 30 La. Ann. 711
(1878).
103. See the text at notes 86-92 supra.
104. See cases cited in note 83, supra. Although this is the most controversial
use of estoppel (see Timberline Equip. Co. v. Davenport, 267 Or. 64, 514 P.2d 1109
(1973); BALLANTINE, supra note 1, at 91), the general common law rule estops a
creditor of the organization if he dealt with it on a corporate basis.
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ration and indicating intent to hold only the corporation, is an example of a
third party receiving a benefit by leading others to rely on his recognition
of their limited liability. A Louisiana dictum approves the use of estoppel
here, 10 5 as does the general rule, which embraces anyone dealing with an
organization as a corporation. 106
When a third party is the debtor of an organization and asserts the
defect in incorporation as an afterthought to escape liability to the "corpo-
rate" plaintiff, he is usually estopped in Louisiana, whether a debtor on an
ordinary contract" or an insurer of the corporation.'0 8 The Louisiana-
cases are not so clear when the party is a surety. One court estopped the
surety when he was a guarantor of the corporation's obligation to another
and later attacked the corporation's existence when called to pay. 09 The
Louisiana Supreme Court held to the contrary when dealing with a surety
who guaranteed to the corporation the fidelity of its employees," 0 but the
decision turned on a prohibitory law denying a corporation without legal
existence the right to sue in its own name,III not on the kind of surety
involved. The common law majority rule in each of these cases estops the
debtor. "
2
105. Williams v. Hewitt, 47 La. Ann. 1076, 17 So. 496 (1895) (dictum).
106. 8 FLETCHER, supra note 1, at 216-17, 219.
107. Shreveport Long Leaf Lumber Co. v. Jones, 188 La. 519, 177 So. 593 (1937)
(dictum); Williams v. Hewitt, 47 La. Ann. 1076, 17 So. 496 (1895) (dictum); Morris
Plan Bank v. Schmidt, 164 So. 270 (La. App. Orl. Cir. 1935) (dictum); see New
Prytania Market Ass'n v. Beoubay, 185 So. 531 (La. App. Orl. Cir. 1939) (dictum);
cf. Blanc v. Germania Nat'l Bank, 114 La. 739, 38 So. 537 (1905) (estoppel applied
to preclude pledgee from denying corporate existence and retaining the item given
in pledge by a defective corporation). See also National Oil Works, Inc. v. Korn
Bros., 6 La. App. 75 (La. App. Orl. Cir.), rev'd on other grounds, 164 La. 800, 114
So. 659 (1927).
108. Liverpool & L. Fire & Life Ins. Co. v. Hunt, 11 La. Ann. 623 (1856).
109. Music Box, Inc. v. Henry Mills and Milwaukee Social Club, 10 La. App.
665, 121 So. 196 (La. App. Orl. Cir. 1929).
110. Workingmen's Accommodation Bank v. Converse, 29 La. Ann. 369(1877);
accord, Workingmen's Bank v. Converse, 33 La. Ann. 963 (1881). But cf. Ameri-
can Homestead Co. v. Linigan, 46 La. Ann. 1118, 15 So. 369 (1894) (criticizing
Workingmen's Accommodation Bank v. Converse, 29 La. Ann. 369 (1877), and
holding the reasoning of that decision inapplicable to actions by the corporation
against a shareholder).
111. LA. CIv. CODE art. 446 provides: "Corporations unauthorized by law or by
an act of the Legislature, enjoy no public character, and can not appear in a court of
justice, but in the individual name of all the members ....... An unincorporated
association now has the capacity to sue and be sued in its own name. LA. CODE CIV.
P. arts. 689 & 738.
112. 8 FLETCHER, supra note 1, at 219, 239, 283-84; see Estoppelto Deny, supra
note 19, at 341-47.
1136 [Vol. 37
COMMENTS
Finally, when a party to a suit opposing an organization has admitted
in court that the corporation exists, he will be estopped to deny the
corporate capacity later in the action, both under the Louisiana 113 and
general' 14 rules. The two rules diverge, however, when the party to be
estopped is the state in a quo warranto proceeding. The general rule estops
the state when it brings the action against the organization in its corporate
name, 115 while the Louisiana courts permit the state to proceed against the
corporation without thereby admitting its corporate existence. 
116
Effect of the Model Business Corporation Act
The law of de facto incorporation and estoppel to deny corporate
existence was in a hopeless state of confusion." 7 Therefore, many states
adopted provisions similar to sections 56 and 146 (formerly sections 50
and 139) of the Model Business Corporation Act,' discarding the de
facto doctrine at least. 119
Section 56 of the Model Act makes issuance of the certificate of
incorporation by the Secretary of State conclusive evidence of valid
113. Latiolais v. Citizens' Bank, 33 La. Ann. 1444 (1881) (alternative basis for
applying estoppel); Peychaud v. Lane, 24 La. Ann. 404 (1872) (alternative holding);
Pochelu v. Kemper, 14 La. Ann. 308 (1859) (basis was judgment against the
corporation in a prior suit); Calhoun v. David Burk Co., 153 So. 568 (La. App. 2d
Cir. 1934). But see Southland Rentals, Inc. v. Walker, 147 So. 2d 73 (La. App. 2d
Cir. 1962), cert. denied, 243 La. 1007, 149 So. 2d 764 (1963) (party which had
obtained a prior judgment solely against the corporation was not estopped to deny
the corporate existence against the members, because LA. R.S. 12:9 (1950) express-
ly imposed liability; the court added that the defendants had not shown that they
had suffered injury).
No estoppel lies unless there was an unequivocal admission that the organiza-
tion was a corporation, as distinguished from an unincorporated business entity.
Williams v. Hewitt, 47 La. Ann. 1076, 17 So. 496 (1895); Spencer Field & Co. v.
Cooks, 16 La. Ann. 153 (1861); accord, 8 FLETCHER, supra note 1, at 269-71; cf.
BALLANTINE, supra note 1, at 89 (in reference to estoppel generally).
114. 8 FLETCHER, supra note 1, at 261-62, 269-70.
115. Id. at 273-76.
116. State v. Debenture Guarantee & Loan Co., 51 La. Ann. 1874, 26 So. 600
(1899); State v. New Orleans Debenture Redemption Co., 51 La. Ann. 1827, 26 So.
586 (1899), aff'd, 180 U.S. 320 (1901).
117. See the authorities cited in note 13, supra. De facto incorporation was the
primary target of criticism, estoppel drawing fire chiefly because disorder followed
from intermingling the two doctrines. See Robertson v. Levy, 197 A.2d 443 (D.C.
Ct. App. 1964); MODEL ACT, supra note 37, §§ 56 & 146, Comments; BALLANTINE,
supra note 1, at 71; Frey, supra note 1, passim.
118. MODEL ACT, supra note 37, §§ 56 & 146. See notes 120 & 123, infra.
119. See authorities cited in note 124, infra.
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incorporation against all except the state in a direct attack. 20 Since
issuance of the certificate cures prior irregularities, there is no need for a
de facto doctrine to protect incorporators from pre-recordation defects.1 21
Furthermore, "any steps short of securing a certificate of incorporation
would not constitute apparent compliance. Therefore a de facto corpora-
tion cannot exist under the Model Act.' ' 22
Section 146 of the Model Act imposes personal liability for attempt-
ing without authority to act as a corporation.1 23 Hence, because authority
to act as a corporation comes only from completing the procedures
specified in the Act and obtaining the certificate as required in section 56,
the two sections probably eliminate estoppel to deny corporate existence
as well as de facto incorporation. 124
120. MODEL ACT, supra note 37, § 56 provides: "Upon the issuance of the
certificate of incorporation, the corporate existence shall begin, and such certificate
of incorporation shall be conclusive evidence that all conditions precedent required
to be performed by the incorporators have been complied with and that the corpora-
tion has been incorporated under this Act, except as against this State in a proceed-
ing to cancel or revoke the certificate of incorporation or for involuntary dissolution
of the corporation."
121. 8 FLETCHER, supra note 1, at 41-42; see Ballantine, A Critical Survey of the
Illinois Business Corporation Act, 1 U. CHI. L. REV. 357, 380 (1934).
122. MODEL ACT, supra note 37, § 56, Comment; see Robertson v. Levy, 197
A.2d 443, 446 (D.C. Ct. App. 1964) ("Before the certificate issues, there is no
corporation de jure, de facto or by estoppel."); Timberline Equip. Co. v. Daven-
port, 267 Or. 64, 514 P.2d 1109 (1973). Contra, Vincent Drug Co. v. Utah State Tax
Comm'n, 17 Utah 2d 202, 407 P.2d 683 (1965) (applied de facto incorporation even
though state had adopted provisions similar to sections 56 and 146 of the Model
Act).
123.. MODEL ACT, supra note 37, § 146 provides: "All persons who assume to act
as a corporation without authority so to do shall be jointly and severally liable for all
debts and liabilities incurred or arising as a result thereof."
124. Robertson v. Levy, 197 A.2d 443 (D.C. Ct. App. 1964); 8 FLETCHER, supra
note 1, at 41-42, 191-92; see Swindel v. Kelly, 499 P.2d 291 (Alas. 1972) (dictum)
(dealt with de facto incorporation only); Timberline Equip. Co. v. Davenport, 267
Or. 64, 514 P.2d 1109 (1973) (dealt with de facto incorporation only); Folk, Corpora-
tion Statutes: 1959-1966, 1966 DUKE L.J. 875, 884-86 (1966) (implies that sections 56
and 146 together eliminate the two doctrines, but notes that estoppel remains if only
section 56 is enacted); MODEL ACT, supra note 37, §§ 56 & 146, Comments (only de
facto incorporation mentioned). But see Vincent Drug Co. v. Utah State Tax
Comm'n, 17 Utah 2d 202, 407 P.2d 683 (1965) (applied de facto incorporation even
though the state had adopted provisions similar to sections 56 and 146); Ballantine,
A Critical Survey of the Illinois Business Corporation Act, 1 U.CHI.L.REV. 357,
380-81 (1934) (stating that de facto incorporation and estoppel might still need to be
invoked in cases of foreign corporations and corporations failing to file a charter or
obtain a certificate of incorporation).
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Remaining Utility of the Doctrines in Louisiana
The 1968 Business Corporation Law
Louisiana adopted a provision similar to section 56 of the Model Act,
section 25 of the Business Corporation Law, 125 making issuance of the
certificate conclusive evidence of due incorporation against all but the
state in a direct action. However, Louisiana did not enact a general
personal liability provision similar to section 146 of the Model Act,
thereby rejecting the trend in many other states. Without further explana-
tion, the comment to section 26 of the Louisiana Act states:
The former provision expressly imposing personal liability on offi-
cers and directors participating in business transactions before filing
of the articles, has been eliminated to permit the full application
of the defacto-corporation and estoppel-to-deny-corporate-existence
rules. 126
Despite this expressed intention to retain "full application," the Act
covers with piecemeal rules many situations where de facto incorporation
might have applied. 127
Even if the comment to section 26 of the Louisiana Act had not been
added, one could have argued convincingly that Louisiana left de facto
incorporation and estoppel to deny corporate existence intact, because
most authorities rely on both sections 56 and 146 of the Model Act
working together to preclude application of the doctrines. 128 On the other
125. LA. R.S. 12:25B (Supp. 1968), as amended by La. Acts 1976, No. 580, § 1,
provides: "When all incorporation taxes, fees and charges have been paid as
required by law, the Secretary of State shall record the articles ...and issue'a
certificate of incorporation . . . .The certificate of incorporation shall 'be conclu-
sive evidence of the fact that the corporation has been duly incorporated, except
that in any proceeding brought by the state to annul, forfeit or vacate a corpora-
tion's franchise, the certificate of incorporation shall be only prima facie evidence
of due incorporation."
Id. § 25C: "Upon the issuance of the certificate of incorporation, the corpora-
tion shall be duly incorporated, and the corporate existence shall begin, as of the
time when the articles were filed with the Secretary of State, except that, if the
articles were so filed within five days (exclusive of legal holidays) after acknow-
ledgement thereof or execution thereof as an authentic act, the corporation shall be
duly incorporated, and the corporate existence shall begin, as of the time of such
acknowledgement or execution."
126. Id. § 26, Comment.
127. See the text at notes 130-42, infra.
128. See authorities cited in note 124, supra. One commentator has said, in
reference to estoppel to deny corporate existence: "Without the equivalent of
section [146 of the Model Act], section [56] should not be construed as ipso facto
removing the traditional discretionary power of courts to decide particular cases so
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hand: "Abolition of the concept of de facto incorporation, which at best
was fuzzy, is a sound result. No reason exists for its continuance under
general corporate laws, where the process of acquiring de jure incorpora-
tion is both simple and clear."' 29 The result of the 1968 Act should be
neither the rigid Model Act position nor "full application." As will be
detailed below, while de facto incorporation should now be eliminated,
many appropriate estoppel applications remain.
When De Facto Incorporation is Obviated by Statute
Nearly all pre-recordation defects are cured by the conclusive pre-
sumption of due incorporation which attaches upon issuance of the certifi-
cate of incorporation, 30 obviating that need for de facto incorporation.
Included in this class are: signing by incorporators who have no capacity
to incorporate, incorporating for an unauthorized purpose, neglecting
publication requirements, and failing to comply with stock subscription
requirements. Besides curing defects that occur prior to issuance of the
certificate of incorporation, the 1968 Act ensures that all of these problems
will be rarer now than under prior statutes. The Act reduced the required
number of incorporators to one. 13 1 It also provided that "[a] corporation
may be formed for any lawful business purposes" with few exceptions. 132
Furthermore, the Business Corporation Law now contains no publication
requirement, nor does it require procuring stock subscriptions or listing
subscribers.
Arguably, incorporation under an unconstitutional statute is a defect
not corrected by issuance of the certificate, as the higher law must prevail;
however, the Louisiana Constitution, in Article XII, Section 12, seems to
adopt the provisions of the Business Corporation Law and other corpora-
tion statutes that regulate methods of ending the corporate existence. That
as to implement reasonable expectations and promote the security of transactions."
Folk, supra note 124, at 885-86. See also Cranson v. International Bus. Mach.
Corp., 234 Md. 477, 200 A.2d 33 (1964) (applying estoppel to deny corporate
existence without mentioning the state's provision similar to section 56; the state
had no statute equivalent to section 146).
129. MODEL AcT, supra note 37, § 146, Comments.
130. See note 125, supra; cf. Louisiana Dist., Church of the Nazarene v. Church
of the Nazarene, 132 So. 2d 667 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1961) (conclusive presumption of
due incorporation attaching under the former law upon issuance of the certificate of
incorporation precluded collateral attack on a corporation not having its charter
executed in authentic form as required). See also the authorities cited in note 121,
supra.
131. LA. R.S. 12:21 (Supp. 1968).
132. Id. § 22; accord, id. § 24B(2).
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section states in part: "Every corporation shall be subject to dissolution or
forfeiture of its charter or franchise, as provided by general law." Thus, if
a corporation were formed in violation of the Louisiana Constitution, a
court might liberally construe this section to conclude that attacks on the
corporate existence are subject to the Business Corporation Law, under
which the conclusive presumption of due incorporation would maintain the
organization's de jure corporate status. This approach would not per-
petuate an "unconstitutional corporation," for the state could attack the
corporation's existence in a direct action. 33
When the articles were not recorded locally but were recorded at the
Secretary of State's office, section 25 of the Louisiana Act clearly renders
the de facto doctrine unnecessary, assuming that the certificate of incorpo-
ration is issued, because the corporation is then de jure. 134 The certificate
of incorporation will have been issued in this situation, for "recording"
presupposes filing and payment of taxes, fees, and charges and is followed
by issuance of the certificate without further action by the incorporators. 135
Section 25D reaffirms that failure to file locally does not prevent de jure
existence: that section, read with section 25C, makes such filing a mere
condition subsequent to incorporation. 136 Arguably, application of the de
facto incorporation theory is appropriate in the more difficult case of an
organization for which there was no recording, if the articles were filed
and the liability was incurred in good faith. This situation is discussed
below. 137
The Louisiana Act permits de jure incorporation without paid-in
capital, making de facto incorporation unnecessary in this situation. No
statement of paid-in capital is required in the articles of incorporation; 138
and even if an amount is specified by the articles, payment is only a
condition precedent to beginning business under section 26.139 Further-
more, the de facto doctrine could not affect the personal liability expressly
133. Id. § 25B; see note 125, supra.
134. Id. § 25B & C; see note 125, supra.
135. Id. § 25B; see note 125, supra.
136. Id. §§ 25C (quoted in note 125, supra) & 25D. See generally HENN, supra
note 1, at 238-39 (discussing conditions subsequent to incorporation).
137. See the text at notes 147-53, infra.
138. LA. R.S. 12:24, Comment (f) (Supp. 1968).
139. Id. § 26 provides: "A corporation formed under this Chapter shall not incur
any debts or begin the transaction of any business, except business incidental to its
organization, or to the obtaining of subscriptions to, or payment for, its shares, until
the amount of paid-in capital with which it will begin business, if stated in the
articles, has been paid in full." Accord, id. § 24, Comment (f).
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imposed by section 92A 14° on officers and directors violating the prohibi-
tion of section 26.
Nor is the de facto doctrine necessary to validate the acts of a
corporation which has functioned after lapse of the time specified in the
articles. Section 31D of the Louisiana Act 141 permits amendment of the
articles to extend the duration of the corporation even if such amendment
occurs after the corporation's duration has expired. Again, this defect will
seldom occur, as a corporation may now have perpetual duration.142
When Estoppel is Obviated by Statute
Estoppel to deny corporate existence will be inapplicable in cases
where the certificate of incorporation has been issued, for two reasons.
First, since the certificate of incorporation is conclusive evidence of due
incorporation, 143 estoppel will be unnecessary in nearly all cases of pre-
issuance defects." Second, if there are any irregularities not cured by the
conclusive presumption, a possible example being incorporation under an
unconstitutional statute, 145 the courts would hardly extend an equitable
doctrine further than a legislative enactment carefully aimed at pre-rec-
ordation defects.
Uses of De Facto Incorporation Not Obviated by Statute But
Nevertheless Inappropriate
Two possible uses for the de facto doctrine remain which are not
clearly obviated by the Louisiana Business Corporation Law of 1968:
when the articles of incorporation were not recorded at all, and when the
articles were recorded locally but not with the Secretary of State. For the
reasons detailed below, in neither of these situations should the courts
apply de facto incorporation, despite the call for "full application" in the
comment to section 26. 1'4
Of course, failure to record can embrace many degrees of noncom-
pliance. At one extreme is failing even to attempt to meet statutory
140. Id. § 92A: "If a corporation has transacted any business in violation of R.S.
12:26, the officers who participated therein and the directors shall be liable jointly
and severally with the corporation and each other for the debts or liabilities of the
corporation arising therefrom."
141. Id. § 31D.
142. Id. §§ 24B(a); 24, Comment (C).
143. Id. § 25B; see note 125, supra.
144. See 8 FLETCHER, supra note 1, at 191-92; Ballantine, A Critical Survey of
the Illinois Business Corporation Act, I U. CHI. L. REv. 357, 380 (1934).
145. See the text preceding note 133, supra.
146. Quoted in the text at note 126, supra.
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requirements; at the other is paying fees and filing the articles, only later
to have them temporarily rejected merely because, for example, the
incorporators' addresses were omitted. When there has been no attempt to
comply, the common law and Louisiana courts have never suggested that
there is de facto incorporation. 147 But when the articles have been filed in
good faith but rejected, a court would be confronted with a most difficult
case, one in which one state supreme court has recognized a de facto
corporation even though that state had adopted statutes similar to both
sections 56 and 146 of the Model Business Corporation Act. 148 Obviously,
the incorporators making such an attempt to comply in Louisiana would
occupy an even stronger position than a party in the situation mentioned in
the comment to section 26, one who participated in business transactions
before filing. 149
Nevertheless, there are cogent reasons for discarding even this appli-
cation of de facto incorporation in Louisiana. De facto incorporation might
be unnecessary when the certificate is later issued, because corporate
existence relates back to filing and execution of the articles under section
25C of the Louisiana Act. 150 But the legislature probably did not intend, in
147. See authorities cited in notes 40 & 42, supra (indicating that Louisiana by
statute and court decision adopted the traditional de facto rationale, including the
requirement of colorable compliance with incorporation laws); 8 FLETCHER, supra
note 1, at 74; Frey, supra note 1, at 1164 ("When confronted with no attempt to
incorporate the judicial mind summarily rejects the idea of 'de facto' corporate
existence. ... ). See also Nichols Const. Corp. v. Spell, 315 So. 2d 801 (La.
App. 1st Cir. 1975) (denying de facto existence where the only grounds asserted
were that the corporation later formed used the same equipment and took on the
same jobs as the predecessor sole proprietorship).
148. Vincent Drug Co. v. Utah State Tax Comm'n, 17 Utah 2d 202, 407 P.2d 683
(1965).
The borderline situation discussed in the text must be distinguished from a
similar case in which de facto incorporation is patently inappropriate. Section 25A
of the Louisiana Act provides: "The articles and initial report may be delivered to
the Secretary of State in advance, for filing as of any specified date (and, if
specified upon such delivery, as of any given time on such date) within thirty days
after the date of delivery." Clearly, de facto incorporation should not be used to
allow one to avoid personal liability on a contract he made after early delivery of the
articles but before the certificate of incorporation was issued. Here, the reasons for
denying de facto status in the situation discussed in the text apply with even more
force. See the text at notes 149-53, supra. Moreover, the person making an early
delivery of the articles and specifying the effective date of filing certainly must have
understood at least that corporate existence would not begin until the specified
filing date; therefore, the element of colorable, good faith compliance is absent and
a de facto corporation cannot exist.
149. Quoted in the text at note 126, supra.
150. Quoted at note 125, supra.
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this situation when a certificate is not issued until some time later, after
correction and refiling, that the corporation's existence relate back to the
first filing. Even if the certificate is never issued or if section 25C is
construed to comport with the above assessment of legislative intent, the
de facto doctrine arguably is precluded by the absence of the second
traditional element, colorable compliance. The comment to section 56 of
the Model Act states: "Under the unequivocal provisions of the Model
Act, any steps short of securing a certificate of incorporation would not
constitute apparent compliance. Therefore a de facto corporation cannot
exist under The Model Act." 151 Louisiana adopted a provision' 52 similar
to section 56, as noted above.
Finally, a court constrained to protect incorporators acting wholly in
good faith should use estoppel to deny corporate existence. Estoppel is a
more manageable tool: it produces a narrower rule and can be successfully
urged in later cases only when fairness demands.153
In the second situation, recording locally but not with the Secretary of
State, it is also inappropriate to use the de facto doctrine, for similar
reasons. First, if filing with the Secretary of State (without issuance of a
certificate) does not constitute apparent compliance, neither should local
filing, which is made a mere condition subsequent to incorporation by the
statute. 154 Second, in cases where fairness requires bestowing a corporate
privilege, estoppel to deny corporate existence should be preferred over de
facto incorporation. 55
Uses of Estoppel Not Obviated by Statute But Nevertheless
Inappropriate
Louisiana decisional law on estoppel to deny corporate existence
remains intact with regard to defective corporations for which a certificate
of incorporation has never been issued. In this case, estoppel enjoys the
same support as de facto incorporation, i.e., the comment to section 26
calling for "full application," and the legislature's rejection of section
146 of the Model Act, viewed in light of the authorities' emphasis on both
sections 56 and 146 of the Model Act working together to discard the
151. MODEL ACT, supra note 37, § 56, Comment (1971).
152. LA. R.S. 12:25 (Supp. 1968); see note 125, supra.
153. See the text at notes 159-62, infra.
154. LA. R.S. 12:25C & D (Supp. 1968); see the text and authorities at note 136,
supra.
155. See the text at notes 159-62, infra.
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doctrines. 156 At the same time, estoppel does not suffer the infirmities of
de facto incorporation, i.e., piecemeal coverage of pre-issuance defects
by specific provisions of the Louisiana Act, 157 and cogent reasons for
discarding de facto incorporation in cases where a certificate was never
issued. 151
Application of estoppel to deny corporate existence, in the appropri-
ate instances discussed below, is a sound result. The courts need a tool to
moderate the rigid Model Act approach, which can lead to injustice.' 59
Estoppel serves that purpose better than de facto incorporation, because
estoppel presents less danger of creating precedent unworkable in another
factual context. Estoppel is precise: there is no need to find that a de facto
corporation with a full array of corporate privileges has been created.1'60
Estoppel is self-limiting: it can be applied only when it is inequitable not to
apply it. 161 Estoppel is straightforward: a detour through de facto rationale
is unnecessary to explain results often reached simply because dealings
were on a corporate basis.' 62
Though some uses of estoppel can serve a valuable function, estop-
156. See the text and authorities at note 124, and authorities cited at note 128,
supra.
157. See the text at note 130-42, supra.
158. See the text at notes 146-55, supra.
159. See, e.g., North Am. Contr. Corp. v. Gibson, 327 So. 2d 444 (La. App. 3d
Cir.), cert. denied, 332 So. 2d 280 (La. 1976) (corporation, sued as a debtor on a
contract made in the corporate name six weeks before incorporation, was estopped
to deny that it had corporate capacity at the time of the transaction). But see Folk,
supra note 124, at 886: "Given the ease with which corporations can be formed, it
would seem desirable now to draft a statute making filing an absolute prerequisite
for limited liability and imposing partnership liability when compliance is not
proven, thereby definitively abandoning the old and uncertain common law doc-
trines of de facto corporation and estoppel."
160. See authorities cited in note 19, supra.
161. See authorities cited in note 24, supra.
162. In reference to de facto incorporation as a reason for bestowing limited
liability, Frey, supra note 1, at 1176-79 states: "[T]he 'de facto' statement, in
addition to being pure surplusage, can be positively misleading.." He explains that a
case stating only that the associates are personally liable when the incorporation
process is defective for a certain reason will not be extended in another case to hold
that such a corporation cannot own property; but, if the first case states that the
corporation is not de facto, therefore the associates are personally liable, a court
will be tempted later to say that such a defective corporation is not de facto,
therefore it cannot own property.
Professor Frey also criticizes estoppel, because it fails to answer the ultimate
question of why limited liability was given.
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ping a creditor of an organization is inappropriate and should be re-
pudiated, as some early Louisiana cases attempted to do. 163 There are two
types of creditors who should not be estopped. The first is a creditor who
sues the defective corporation's individual members on a contract made as
a corporation in the usual course of business while the creditor believed
the organization duly incorporated. The "estoppel" applied to this cred-
itor is not genuine estoppel. There was no "holding out" of a pretended
corporation by the party to be estopped:164 the creditor did not represent
that the organization was duly incorporated; instead he acted on the
organization's representation. The organization or its members cannot
truthfully say they relied to their prejudice on an act of the creditor,' 65
since the creditor's actions were based solely on his limited knowledge of
the organization, while the organization's members had superior means of
discovering whether the proper steps had been taken in formation. Finally,
no "benefit" went to the creditor as a result of his actions, for he will get
no more from the members than he had a right to expect from the
corporation-performance as agreed. Certainly, the creditor who is not
estopped will recover from a pool of assets he had thought were out of
reach, but denying him recovery on that basis alone should not be called
estoppel. In the rare case where the creditor's actions go far enough to
mislead and seriously prejudice the members-and when he actually
indicated an intention to hold only the organization-it is more correct to
say that he impliedly agreed to the limited liability of the members. There
is support in Louisiana for .this straightforward approach.'16
Another objection to estopping the creditor of a defective corporation
163. See cases cited in note 86, supra.
164. See Robertson v. Levy, 197 A.2d 443 (D.C. Ct. App. 1964); Timberline
Equip. Co. v. Davenport, 267 Or. 64,514 P.2d 1109 (1973); BALLANTINE, supra note
1, at 88; Frey, supra note 1, at 1162; Estoppel to Deny, supra note 19, at 342.
165. See Robertson v. Levy, 197 A.2d 443 (D.C. Ct. App. 1964); BALLANTINE,
supra note 1, at 88; Estoppel to Deny, supra note 19, at 341-42.
166. Two Louisiana cases expressed this contractual reason for permitting as-
sociates of a defective corporation to enjoy limited liability, but they unnecessarily
added that such implied contractual limitations are a basis for estoppel. Tulane Imp.
Co. v. S. A. Chapman & Co., 129 La. 562, 56 So. 509 (1911); Bond & Braswell v.
Scott Lumber Co., 128 La. 818, 55 So. 468 (1911). In appropriate situations, these
two cases could serve as authority for simply finding an implied agreement. See
also Sentell v. Hewitt, 50 La. Ann. 3, 22 So. 970 (1898) (an incorporator had written
the plaintiff creditor, saying that he agreed to be personally liable while his as-
sociates in the organization had to be given limited liability; held that because the
creditor dealt with the defective corporation after receiving the letter, he had
impliedly agreed to the limitation of liability); BALLANTINE, supra note 1, at 92, 96;
Frey, supra note 1, at 1154, 1163, 1177.
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from denying corporate existence, when he dealt with persons actively
transacting business as agents of the pretended corporation, is that such
estoppel is in derogation of Louisiana mandate law. In North American
Contracting Corp. v. Gibson, 167 the individual defendants who had con-
tracted in the name of a corporation not formed until after the transaction
were held liable as "agents signing a contract for a nonexistent principal"
under Louisiana Civil Code articles 3010, 3012, and 3013. Estoppel to
deny corporate existence was not urged by the defendants in this case
probably because they were unable to prove a necessary part of the
"reliance" element, their ignorance of the defects, 68 as they had not
incorporated until six weeks after the transaction. However, even had the
defendants met all the elements of estoppel, they would have remained
"agents signing a contract for a nonexistent principal. ' 169 Corporate
existence is not conferred by estoppel.1
70
Professor Ballantine examined the great conflict in the authorities
concerning estoppel of a creditor of a defective corporation and concluded
that in a suit to impose personal liability upon the members of a corpora-
tion so defective that it cannot be recognized as a de facto corporation,
only the active associates such as those acting as directors, officers, or
agents of the ostensible corporation should be personally liable while
passive associates should not be.' 7' This approach apparently has not
appealed to the courts, for Professor Frey found, in studying all the limited
liability cases decided prior to 1952, that "one is not justified in conclud-
ing that participation in management is an important factor in predicting
the probable impact of a defect in incorporation upon the liability of the
members.' 1 72 Professor Ballantine's argument, which is based on con-
siderations of fairness to the unaware, passive associate, loses its force
today in many jurisdictions, including Louisiana, where "the process of
acquiring de jure incorporation is both simple and clear." 173 The passive
shareholder has a better opportunity to protect himself than does the
creditor. The shareholder can limit his exposure by seeing that no business
is transacted before issuance of the certificate, and he is protected once the
167. 327 So.2d 444 (La. App. 3d Cir.), cert. denied, 332 So.2d 280 (La. 1976).
168. See authorities cited in note 26, supra.
169. But see BALLANTINE, supra note 1, at 94-96 (implies that persons may be
held individually liable as agents of a nonexistent principal only if they "actively
engage in business for profit under the name and pretense of a corporation which
they know has no legal existence .... ").
170. See authorities cited in note 19, supra.
171. BALLANTINE, supra note 1, at 91-%.
172. Frey, supra note 1, at 1178.
173. MODEL AcT, supra note 37, § 146, Comment.
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certificate is issued, because pre-issuance defects are cured 174 and because
passive officers and all mere shareholders are not liable for business
transacted before capital is paid in. 175
Professor Folk noted the ease with which corporations can now be
formed and recommended elimination of both de facto incorporation and
estoppel to deny corporate existence, at least so far as they affect the
privilege of limited liability.176 The course suggested in this Comment
would reach the end urged by Professor Folk only in the case of a creditor
of the defective corporation seeking to impose personal liability on the
associates, while retaining estoppel for use in other more appropriate
cases, such as estopping a debtor organization from denying its own
corporate existence when sued as a corporation.
The second situation of creditor estoppel that the courts should
discard occurs when the creditor contracted knowing he dealt with an
inchoate corporation and indicated an intent to hold only the cor-
poration. 177 Here, the rules concerning a promoter's liability for contracts
made before creation of the corporation cover the issue of limited liability
with greater precision and theoretical consistency. 17 8 But if courts insist on
using estoppel language in this case, they are not wholly in error, for at
least clear reliance on the creditor's recognition of corporate status is
present: those signing for the organization depend entirely upon the tacit
agreement to protect them.
Another case in which estoppel should be replaced by a better
rationale is estopping the corporation, its members, or a third party
because they have admitted the corporation's existence by pleading in
court. 179 True, "holding out," "reliance," and "benefit" might exist in
these situations if the pleading were used to lure the other party into
ambush. However, the estoppel label should be discarded, whether the
conduct working the estoppel is a pleading in the same or a prior suit or a
judgment obtained against the party in a prior action. If the estoppel arises
merely from a pleading (called "judicial estoppel" in common law juris-
dictions), 80 the narrower Louisiana Civil Code doctrine of judicial con-
174. See authorities and text at note 130, supra.
175. LA. R.S. 12:92A (Supp. 1968). Of course, estoppel could not override an
express statutory personal liability provision such as § 92A.
176. Folk, supra note 124, at 886.
177. See authorities and text at notes 105-06, supra.
178. See Folse v. Loreauville Sugar Factory, Inc., 156 So. 667 (La. App. 1st Cir.
1934); BALLANTINE, supra note 1, at 114-18; 1 FLETCHER, supra note 6, at 775-81.
179. See authorities and text at notes 101-02 & 113-16, supra.
180. See Stevens v. New Orleans & N.E. R.R., 341 F. Supp. 497 (E.D. La.
1972).
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fession'81 applies, so the courts are not free to borrow rules from other
jurisdictions. If the estoppel arises from a prior judgment (called "estop-
pel by judgment" in common law jurisdictions) ,182 the courts should apply
Louisiana res judicata law,183 which gives a more limited preclusive effect
to judgments than the complementary common law doctrines of res judica-
ta and estoppel by judgment.184
Appropriate Uses of Estoppel
There are many instances where estoppel remains the best available
tool. When the organization is sued as a debtor on a contract made as a
corporation, the organization and its members should be estopped to deny
181. LA. CIV. CODE art. 2291 provides: "The judicial confession is the declara-
tion which the party, or his special attorney in fact, makes in a judicial proceeding.
It amounts to full proof against him who has made it. It can not be divided against
him. It can not be revoked, unless it be proved to have been made through an error
in fact. It can not be revoked on a pretense of an error in law." See, e.g., J. H.
Jenkins Contractors, Inc. v. Farriel, 261 La. 374, 259 So. 2d 882 (1972); Jackson v.
Gulf Ins. Co., 250 La. 819, 199 So. 2d 886 (1967); Sanderson v. Frost, 198 La. 295, 3
So. 2d 626 (1941). A judicial confession in Louisiana does not arise from a pleading
in a prior suit, id., while: "An estoppel [under the general common law rule] may
arise from allegations or admissions in former proceedings, and this applies to an
estoppel to deny corporate existence." 8 FLETCHER, supra note 1, at 269 (footnotes
omitted).
182. See Stevens v. New Orleans & N.E. R.R., 341 F. Supp. 497 (E.D. La.
1972); 8 FLETCHER, supra note 1, at 284-86.
183. LA. CiV. CODE art. 2286 provides: "The authority of the thing adjudged
takes place only with respect to what was the object of the judgment. The thing
demanded must be the same; the demand must be founded on the same cause of
action; the demand must be between the same parties, and formed by them against
each other in the same quality." See Mitchell v. Bertolla, 340 So. 2d 287 (La. 1976).
184. In the case of one suing a corporation in the first suit and then suing the
shareholders in the second suit, Louisiana res judicata would not bar the second
suit, because there is no identity of parties. See State v. Debenture Guarantee &
Loan Co., 51 La. Ann. 1874, 1885, 26 So. 600, 605 (1899); Hincks v. Converse, 37
La. Ann. 484 (1885) (dictum). See also Quinette v. Delhommer, 247 La. 1121, 176
So. 2d 399 (1965). Furthermore, even though the common law rule of estoppel to
deny corporate existence bars the second suit, 8 FLETCHER, supra note 1, at 284- 6,
such a result is incompatible with Louisiana law in two ways. First, collateral
estoppel might not survive in Louisiana, Mitchell v. Bertolla, 340 So. 2d 287 (La.
1976), but even if it does, it applies only when the suits are on different causes of
action, as defined broadly by the common law. Id. Second, the Louisiana courts
using collateral estoppel in the past have preferred to apply it only when the parties
in both actions were identical. See Mitchell v. Bertolla, 340 So. 2d 287 (La. 1976);
California Co. v. Price, 234 La. 338, 99 So. 2d 743 (1957); Comment, Preclusion
Devices in Louisiana: Collateral Estoppel, 35 LA. L. REV. 158, 171 (1974) (calling
for re-examination of the requirement). But see Brown v. Globe Tool & Engr. Co.,
337 So. 2d 894 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1976) (and authorities cited therein).
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corporate existence because the organization usually has held itself out as
a corporation and the other party has relied on that representation. The
Louisiana Third Circuit Court of Appeal held in this situation that "[t]he
corporation, . . . having recognized the validity and accepted the benefits
of the contract, is also liable since it is estopped to deny its corporate
existence at the time the contract was entered into.'1 8 5
In the analogous case of an organization sued as a tortfeasor,18 6
estoppel should also be used, despite the failure of these facts to mesh with
the traditional rationale. There will be no "reliance" at the time the
liability is incurred, since the plaintiff cannot choose his tortfeasor. How-
ever, arguably there is "reliance" later, when the plaintiff files his suit
against the organization as a corporation, the capacity in which the
organization dealt with the public. In any case, estoppel here is appropri-
ate, as it might be necessary to prevent injustice (by precluding dismissal
of a subsequent suit against the members due to prescription), and might
serve judicial efficiency by avoiding an unnecessary suit-one against the
associates to reach indirectly the same assets.
Estoppel to deny corporate existence should also be applied when a
shareholder tries to escape liability for his stock subscription by attacking
the corporate existence. The reason for estopping the shareholder in East
Pascagoula Hotel Co. v. West'1 7 remains convincing: "He cannot now,
by such objections, refuse to pay his note for stock, for it was on the faith
of his note, and notes of a similar character, that the public may have been
induced to credit the company." 88 The courts should also estop a share-
holder contracting with the organization on an ordinary contract, because
the reasons for estopping other debtors where equity demands also apply
to a shareholder189 and because the shareholder is in a better position to
discover the true legal status of the organization.
When a shareholder attacks the corporate existence for reasons other
than escaping liability, such as to dissolve it as a partnership, estoppel is
often appropriate, as shown by the cases.190 But here, even more than in
the usual case where estoppel is argued, each situation will present a new
185. North Am. Contr. Corp. v. Gibson, 327 So.2d 444, 451 (La. App. 3d Cir.),
cert. denied, 332 So.2d 280 (La. 1976).
186. See, e.g., Vredenburg v. Behan, 33 La. Ann. 627 (1881).
187. 13 La. Ann. 545 (1858).
188. Id. See generally LA. R.S. 12:93A (Supp. 1968) (detailing the extent of a
shareholder's liability for an unpaid share subscription).
189. See the text at notes 191-93, infra.
190. See authorities cited in note 99, supra.
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assortment of equitable considerations, a fact which warns against adopt-
ing a general rule.
There are several cases remaining in which estoppel of the party
dealing with the organization is correct. The one occurring most often is
that of a debtor liable under an ordinary contract who asserts the defective
incorporation of the creditor organization as an afterthought, to escape
liability. 191 Although the traditional elements of "holding out" and "re-
liance" are absent here, two considerations militate in favor of estoppel.
First, the debtor has received a "benefit" and recognized the organization
as a corporation.1 92 Second, the debtor is not treated unfairly, for he is
required only to perform as agreed, though to a different person.
193
A surety liable to a third party, with a defective corporation as
principal, should be estopped to deny the corporate existence of its
principal. If such a case arises in the usual context, a major stockholder
guaranteeing the organization's obligations at the creditor's behest, the
court should look beyond mere form and recognize the indirect benefit to
the surety. 94 Clearly, a compensated surety has also received a benefit
and should be estopped.
Despite the two cases rejecting estoppel in similar situations, there is
no reason to distinguish the usual case of a surety indebted to the defective
corporation, for the surety clearly received a benefit, in the form of
premiums. The case refusing to apply estoppel in this situation, 195 where
the court relied on the Louisiana Civil Code article 446 prohibition against
corporations unauthorized by law appearing in a court of justice, is no
longer authoritative, since Louisiana Code of Civil Procedure articles 689
191. See authorities and text at note 107, supra.
192. See cases cited in notes 89-90 & 107-08, supra. See also North Am. Contr.
Corp. v. Gibson, 327 So. 2d 444, 451 (La. App. 3d Cir.), cert. denied, 332 So. 2d 280
(La. 1976) (quoted in the text at note 185, supra; approving the "benefit" rationale
in the context of estopping a corporate debtor attempting to deny its own exist-
ence).
193. BALLANTINE, supra note 1, at 90-91. Of course, other factors might inter-
vene: for example, if the debtor can claim compensation, see LA. CIv. CODE arts.
2207 et seq., against an individual member and not against the corporation, the court
should refuse to apply the equitable remedy of estoppel.
194. See Universal C.I.T. Corp. v. Love, 264 So. 2d 281, 284 (La. App. 1st Cir.
1972) (dictum), rev'd on other grounds, 279 So. 2d 182 (La. 1973) ("We also think it
would be patently inequitable to allow one who had guaranteed the debts of a
corporation to later deny its existence when called upon to satisfy such a debt.").
195. Workingmen's Accommodation Bank v. Converse, 29 La. Ann. 369 (1877),
criticized in American Homestead Co. v. Linigan, 46 La. Ann. 1118, 15 So. 369
(1894).
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and 738 give an unincorporated association the procedural capacity to sue
and be sued in its own name. In a recent case, 196 the Louisiana Fourth
Circuit Court of Appeal declined to estop a surety from denying the
corporate existence of a defectively incorporated engineering firm to
which the surety would otherwise have been liable. The engineering firm
had asserted its Private Works Act 197 privilege and the surety had filed a
bond to remove the encumbrances from the developer's property. The
defendants filed exceptions to the engineering firm's action, asserting that
the plaintiff had no right or cause of action since the services for which
payment was due had been rendered before the corporation was created
and only those performing the work are entitled to the privilege. The Court
of Appeal held for the surety, stating that the engineering firm's estoppel
arguments were insufficient "to mitigate the long established rule that the
lien statutes . . . are considered stricti juris and must be rigidly con-
strued. "198 In light of the dominant role played by the strict interpretation
rule, this case is not authority that sureties liable to the defective corpora-
tion are immune from estoppel.
Estoppel is appropriate and should be applied in the similar case of an
insurer of the corporation. 199 It has recognized the corporation and pock-
eted the premiums.
Conclusions
The remaining utility of de facto incorporation and estoppel to deny
corporate existence can be summarized as follows. 2°°
1. De facto incorporation is no longer applicable in these situa-
tions: 201 signing by incorporators who have no capacity to incorporate,
incorporating for an unauthorized purpose, neglecting publication require-
ments, failing to comply with stock subscription requirements, incorporat-
ing under an unconstitutional statute, functioning after lapse of the corpo-
196. Subdivision Planning Eng'r, Inc. v. Manor Dev. Corp., 337 So. 2d 618 (La.
App. 4th Cir. 1976), cert. granted, 341 So. 2d 405 (La. 1977).
197. LA. R.S. 9:4801 et seq. (amended in part by La. Acts 1975, No. 673, § 2).
198. Subdivision Planning Eng'r, Inc. v. Manor Dev. Corp., 337 So.2d 618, 620
(La. App. 4th Cir. 1976), cert. granted, 341 So. 2d 405 (La. 1977).
199. See the text at note 108, supra.
200. These classifications are offered only as a key to the more detailed discus-
sion above, for it is foolish to superimpose unqualified rules on an area of the law
which has been called "a wilderness of single instances." American Ball Bearing
Co. v. Adams, 222 F. 967, 976 (N.D. Ohio 1915), rev'd sub. nom. Kardo Co. v.
Adams, 231 F. 950 (6th Cir. 1916).
201. See notes 130-42, supra.
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rate lifetime specified in the articles, and neglecting to meet paid-in capital
requirements.
2. Estoppel to deny corporate existence is no longer necessary to
overcome defects occurring prior to issuance of the certificate of incor-
poration. 20 2
3. De facto incorporation is inappropriate even in those cases where
its application was not obviated by the 1968 Corporation Law, and should
therefore be completely repudiated.20 3 These situations are: failing com-
pletely either to file or to have recorded the articles or incorporation, and
having the articles recorded locally but not with the Secretary of State.
4. Estoppel to deny corporate existence is inappropriate and there-
fore should not be applied in the following cases: 204 against a third-party
creditor who sues the associates of the organization on an obligation which
the organization incurred as a corporation, against a third-party creditor
who contracted with the organization knowing he dealt with an inchoate
corporation and indicating intent to hold only the corporation to be
formed, and against an organization or an opposing party on the ground
that the corporate existence was admitted in court.
5. Finally, estoppel to deny corporate existence is appropriate and
should be applied when equitable, in the following cases: 205 against the
defective corporation or its members when the defective corporation is
sued as a debtor on liability incurred as a corporation, against a surety who
is liable to a third party with the defective corporation as principal, and
against a debtor of the corporation, whether he is a debtor on an ordinary
contract, a surety, or an insurer.
Many have hailed the Model Business Corporation Act as abolishing
de facto incorporation and estoppel to deny corporate existence. In the
Business Corporation Law of 1968, Louisiana resisted the trend and
feigned an intention fully to revive both doctrines, while simultaneously
obviating most of the de facto doctrine with specific statutory provisions.
In contrast, estoppel was not eliminated by the 1968 Business Corporation
Law and remains the best available tool when justice demands bestowal of
a corporate privilege not available under another legal theory.
Fritz B. Ziegler
202. See notes 143-45, supra.
203. See notes 146-55, supra.
204. See notes 156-84, supra.
205. See notes 185-99, supra.
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